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Commentary on the Democratic Accountability of
Non-Governmental Organizations
Robert 0. Keohane
The essays on the accountability of non-governmental organizations ("NGOs")
in the spring issue of this journal were so thoughtful and balanced that all I can do is
to make explicit some points that seemed implicit, particularly in the essays by
Kingsbury, Spiro, and Wapner.
Accountability is not a pure good. Much of the writing on accountability seems to
imply that accountability is like friendship: more is better. But as Kingsbury observes
in passing, "the total possibilities for participation are inescapably constrained by the
need to accomplish the institution's tasks."' Too much accountability could hinder
NGOs from performing their tasks, as itemized by Spar and Dail in their typology of
NGOs.
2
It is important to distinguish internal from external accountability, as the essays
by Spiro and Wapner do. NGOs often have weak institutions for internal
accountability, but on the other hand, their members can easily exit. The more
important point, however, is that even effective internal accountability would not
guarantee external accountability. The claims of NGOs to a voice over policy depend
on beliefs that they actually speak for victims of injustice, and that they are true to the
normative principles that they articulate. However, NGOs are internally accountable
to their members, usually privileged people in rich countries whose knowledge of
NGO policies comes largely from the organizations themselves. Clearly there is a
temptation for NGOs to engage in symbolic politics, satisfying their internal
constituencies at the expense of effectively fostering the values they claim to promote.
The vulnerability of NGOs to exit by their members does not guarantee either
effectiveness or accountability to the people whose lives they most affect. Kingsbury
provides an example of such a tension, in the campaign against fur sealing that was
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initially promoted by Greenpeace, but that had adverse effects on the livelihoods of
indigenous hunting communities in the Arctic.
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The effects of NGOs on overall patterns of external accountability depend not
only on the accountability of NGOs, but on their actions to hold other entities
accountable. As Spiro points out, NGOs play an important role in holding states and
intergovernmental organizations accountable to broader publics, by serving as
independent sources of criticism. He is right that "[g]overnments can get away with an
awful lot before having to answer to their memberships."
Certain traditional forms of accountability are irrelevant to the external
accountability of NGOs, or would be pernicious. In domestic democracies, officials
are accountable to electorates, but there is no world electorate that can hold
intergovernmental organizations, much less states, accountable. Legal accountability is
of only limited relevance. NGOs are, as Kingsbury notes, subject to national public
law, but if there is an international public law, it is only emerging, and is more a set of
norms that serves as a "shared starting point" than an enforceable legal code.' I am
more cautious than Spiro about holding NGOs accountable to "obligations," since it
is not clear to what entities the NGOs would be held accountable.6 Here the author's
use of the passive tense obscures key issues of politics. If NGOs are to be held
accountable to intergovernmental organizations, controlled ultimately by
governments, their most outstanding virtue-independence from governmental
authority-would be threatened.
NGOs should be held externally accountable chiefly through peer and
reputational accountability. Wapner emphasizes that NGOs, unlike states, can only
be effective by working through networks, since NGOs do not have the same
operational responsibilities, huge budgets, or control over force. They can only be
effective, therefore, if they earn the respect and trust of a set of their peers. Were an
NGO to be "shunned" by too many other NGOs, its efficacy would be threatened7
An NGO's public reputation is perhaps even more important. Wapner notes that
Greenpeace lost credibility and support as a result of erroneously campaigning for the
oil rig Brent Spar to be dismantled on land rather than dumped in the North Sea.'
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NGOs depend on credibility and cannot afford many incidents such as this, or
sustained and well-founded negative publicity.
How strong accountability relationships need to be depends on the power of the
entity being held accountable. Accountability and power are closely linked because
true accountability requires that outsiders be able to impose costs on insiders. If the
insiders control a very powerful organization, such as a major multinational
corporation or a state, they may be able to ignore many sanctions against them. But if
the insiders only manage a weak NGO, they will be much more vulnerable. It follows
that Spiro and Wapner are right to emphasize that states are often less accountable,
externally, than NGOs. Independently of how well democracy works at home, the
United States, when it operates abroad, is not very accountable to anyone. It is
powerful enough to refuse to pay its UN dues for over a decade, ignore UN General
Assembly resolutions, and to brush aside the reservations of its NATO allies
whenever it so chooses. Certainly it bears some reputational costs, and it may be
foolish to act unilaterally; but its effectiveness is not necessarily strongly affected. In
contrast, no NGO could withstand a fraction of the criticism faced by the United
States without crippling its ability to achieve its objectives.
The contributions to the symposium on the accountability of NGOs in the
Spring 2002 issue of the Chicago Journal of International Law are excellent. They
also, it seems to me, have the right tone. NGOs vary in their internal accountability,
and, like other entities in world politics, are only held externally accountable through
peer monitoring and reputation, both relatively weak mechanisms. Yet since NGOs
are themselves relatively weak, their external accountability deficits are not as severe as
the accountability deficits for other organizations in world politics, particularly states.
NGOs should be scrutinized and their frequent lack of accountability criticized,
especially when they become powerful. But their contributions should also be
evaluated within the broader context of the external accountability of a variety of
entities, including democratic states, in world politics.
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